Organizing for Resistance

Introduction

Between the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000 and March 22, 2004, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that Hamas was responsible for a lethal wave of approximately 425 attacks against Israeli citizens and their interests, resulting in nearly 2500 injured or killed.1 It is remarkable that a single organization had the organizational capacity to perpetrate such a concerted, sustained wave of attacks. Indeed, over the course of the four years, attacks occurred nearly every four days and, on average, harmed more than five individuals each time. This is contrasted with the more grassroots Swords of Truth, a militant, religious Palestinian group that detonated bombs at nightclubs that caused damage, but no injuries.2 How does a violent non-state group like Hamas coordinate to achieve these types of ends? More specifically, what factors make it possible for a group such as Hamas to carry out such damaging campaigns? ...