Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine

This is a study of a body of doctrine, the doctrine of complicity, that determines when one person is liable for a crime committed by another. Doctrine may be studied in several ways depending on the question asked. One question asks what the doctrine is in some jurisdiction. This is the question primarily addressed by treatise writers. Another question asks whether the doctrine serves the purposes of the law and, to the extent it does not, how it should be altered. This is the question addressed by those engaged in revising the law. I do not mean that these questions can be answered independently of one another, only that they are different questions. In any event, the question this study addresses is distinguishable from both. It asks how the doctrine of complicity can best be interpreted as a coherent concept. This entails articulating the relationships between different parts of complicity...

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Legal versus Moral Complicity

Abstract

Since the publication of Kadish’s article ‘Complicity, Cause, and Blame’ in 1985, legal scholars have taken great interest in the notion of complicity and have produced a significant number of publications on the subject. With the exception of Christopher Kutz, these scholars have largely ignored the moral, as opposed to legal, aspects of complicity. In this paper I make an attempt to compare the moral and legal notions of complicity. I will argue that, unless one takes a position of strict consequentialism, the moral notion of complicity casts a wider net than the legal notion. This is a point of no small importance. People need to realize that if they skirt the boundaries of legal complicity, their behavior might well still qualify as complicity on moral grounds.

1. Since the publication of Kadish’s article ‘Complicity, Cause, and Blame’ in 1985, legal scholars have taken great interest in the notion of...

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