Covert Behavior

In a recent paper, Moore (2001) compares the behavior analytic treatment of so-called mental phenomena with other behaviorist approaches, in particular, with logical behaviorism and conceptual analysis (see also Moore, 1980, 1981, 1995). Moore concludes that behavior analysis gives a more adequate account of the phenomena than the other positions. In this note, I will argue that the behavior analytic treatment has itself some fundamental shortcomings. These problems are avoided if we adopt a behaviorist theory that has the following features: (i) it only accepts the existence of entities (factors, events, states, etc.) if this existence is supported by empirical evidence, (ii) it is based on Quine’s materialist repudiation theory which assigns no role at all to mental entities, (iii) it acknowledges the well documented fact that organisms can acquire new behavior not only by operant conditioning but also by being exposed to the pairing of two (salient) stimuli.